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PROPOSITIONAL FAITH:  
WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT
Daniel Howard-Snyder
Super Bowl XLV. It’s Super Bowl Sunday, 2011. 
Pittsburgh’s down to Green Bay, 21–3; it’s near 
the end of the second quarter. I’m taking in the 
game at my favorite dive, working on some 
nachos and a super-sized margarita. I’m a par-
tisan of neither team. I just want to see a good 
game. The guy sitting next to me, however, is 
a loyal Pittsburgh fan, as indicated by the grim 
look on his face. The Packers have possession; 
they’re moving steadily toward Steelers terri-
tory, again. During a break in the action, I strike 
up a conversation:
Me: I was hoping the game would be close. Oh 
well . . . another Super Bowl blowout. I 
think I’ll head home at halftime.
Fan: Be patient; be patient. The Steelers’ll win.
Me: You can’t be serious. No team has ever 
overcome more than a 9-point deficit 
to win a Super Bowl. And look at the 
Packer’s position: Pittsburgh’s 47 with a 
first down.
Fan: I am serious. I have faith that they’ll win.
Me: What? You believe they’re going to win?
Fan: No, I don’t believe they’ll win; I said I 
have faith that they will.
My topic is faith. More accurately, my 
topic is propositional faith. What is propo-
sitional faith? At a first approximation, we 
might answer that it is the psychological 
attitude picked out by standard uses of the 
English locution “S has faith that p,” where 
p takes declarative sentences as instances, as 
in “He has faith that they’ll win.” Although 
correct, this answer is not nearly as informa-
tive as we might like. Many people say that 
there is a more informative answer. They 
say that, at the very least, propositional faith 
requires propositional belief. More precisely, 
they say that faith that p requires belief that p 
or that it must be partly constituted by belief 
that p. This view is common enough; call it 
the Common View.
 I have two main aims in this paper: (i) to 
exhibit the falsity of the Common View, and 
(ii) to sketch a more accurate and comprehen-
sive account of what propositional faith is.
1. Clearing the Brush,  
Setting the Stage
 There are many things labeled “faith” that 
are clearly not propositional faith. To avoid 
error and to circumscribe my topic, I begin 
by clearing them away.
 In The Epistle of Jude, the author exhorts 
readers to “earnestly contend for the faith,” 
that is, the propositions constitutive of the 
basic Christian story and ethic.1 Propositional 
faith is not those propositions, or any others. 
It is an attitude that has a proposition as its 
object, or a state of affairs. Occasionally, one 
hears that faith is a process. For example, ac-
cording to Alvin Plantinga, “the term ‘faith’ 
. . . denote[s] the whole tripartite process” of 
coming to believe the Gospel as a result of 
the Holy Spirit’s instigating such belief upon 
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encountering the Gospel.2 Propositional faith 
is not this process, or any other. Nor is it an 
adventure or journey, as when people some-
times speak of their “journey of faith.” Like 
propositional fear and propositional hope, 
propositional faith is a propositional attitude.
 Sometimes people speak of believing or 
taking something on faith. I believe on faith 
that Half-Mile’s Pacific Crest Trail maps are 
accurate; Mark takes it on faith that devotion 
to Amitābha will result in enlightenment. 
That is, we believe or take these things on 
testimony or authority.3 Propositional faith is 
not to be identified with believing or taking 
something on testimony or authority. Frances 
has faith that her young sons will live long 
and fulfilling lives, but she does not believe 
or take it on testimony or authority.
 According to Martin Luther, faith is “con-
fidence and knowledge of God’s grace.”4 
John Calvin concurs: faith is “a firm and 
sure knowledge of the divine favor toward 
us.”5 The Catholic Encyclopedia says faith is 
a “kind of knowledge.”6 Propositional faith, 
however, is not to be identified with knowl-
edge. Hud can have faith that the president 
will lead us to victory without knowing she 
will. Knowledge is factive; propositional 
faith is not. (I leave it open whether faith is 
compatible with knowledge.)
 According to Thomas Aquinas, says El-
eonore Stump, faith is “assent [to a proposi-
tion] generated by the will’s acting on the 
intellect,” held “with certainty, without any 
hesitation or hanging back.”7 This is not 
propositional faith, for four reasons. First, if 
propositional faith is assent, then, since assent 
is a mental act and not even partly constituted 
by belief, propositional faith cannot be partly 
constituted by belief—but it can be. Second, 
if propositional faith is assent, then, since 
assent lasts about as long as a handshake, 
propositional faith is a fleeting affair—but it 
typically is not. Third, although propositional 
faith might have an act of will in its causal 
genesis, it need not. Fourth, propositional 
faith does not require “certainty, without any 
hesitation or hanging back.” A wife might 
have faith that her marriage will survive 
a crisis, while harboring doubts about it. 
Indeed, propositional faith is precisely that 
attitude in virtue of which she might possess 
the inner stability and impetus that enables 
her to contribute to the realization of that 
state of affairs, despite her lack of certainty. 
Moreover, her faith might well involve some 
“hesitation or hanging back.” We must take 
care not to identify what we might regard as 
an ideal instance of propositional faith—say, 
one that exhibits “certainty, without any hesi-
tation or hanging back”—with a real instance 
of it. The real need not be the ideal.
 We sometimes say things of the form “S 
has faith in x,” where x takes as instances the 
name of a person or some other entity. So 
said, faith in something is relative to some 
domains but not others. I have faith in my hik-
ing sticks—as stabilizers, not bear deterrents. 
I have faith in my wife—as a friend, wife, and 
lover, not as a horticulturalist. Some people 
say that propositional faith cannot be the at-
titude picked out by uses of “faith in x” since 
one can have faith that x is thus-and-so even 
if x does not exist, but one can no more have 
faith in x when x does not exist than one can 
jump in a lake when there are no lakes. Faith 
in x implies the existence of x; faith that x is 
thus-and-so does not.8 I suspect these people 
are wrong. Just as faith-that is nonfactive, so 
faith-in lacks existential import. But even if 
they’re right, we can still ask whether propo-
sitional faith is the attitude one would have if x 
existed and one had faith in x. Although, in that 
case, it might seem natural to identify faith in 
something, as thus-and-so, with faith that it is 
thus-and-so, faith in something requires more, 
namely entrusting one’s welfare to it in some 
way. But one can have faith that something is 
thus-and-so without entrusting one’s welfare to 
it in any way, as when I have faith that Emily 
will survive breast cancer but I do not entrust 
my well-being to her or her survival.
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 Propositional faith is not a proposition, state 
of affairs, process, or journey; it’s an attitude, 
an attitude that is not to be identified with 
knowledge or assent; it need not be based on 
authority or testimony, and it need not involve 
certainty, eagerness, generation by an act of 
will, or entrusting one’s welfare to someone. 
However, to say what something is not is not 
to say what it is. So our question remains: 
What is propositional faith? (Unless I indicate 
otherwise, I will hereafter use “faith” to mean 
propositional faith, faith that.)
 To set the stage for assessing the Common 
View’s answer, a word on belief and doubt is 
in order. What I have to say will be conten-
tious and unconscionably brief.
 Belief is something mental, specifically a 
mental state, not a mental occurrence like 
an act of mental assent or a process of 
deliberation. More specifically still, it is a 
dispositional state that manifests itself under 
certain conditions like those in the partial 
dispositional profile William Alston provides:
1. If S believes that p, then if someone asks S 
whether p, S will tend to respond affirma-
tively.
2. If S believes that p, then, if S considers 
whether it is the case that p, S will tend to 
feel it to be the case that p.
3. If S believes that p, then, if S takes q to fol-
low from p, S will tend to believe q.
4. If S believes that p, then, if S engages in 
practical or theoretical reasoning, S will tend 
to use p as a premise when appropriate.
5. If S believes that p, then, if S learns that 
not-p, S will tend to be surprised.
6. If S believes that p, then, given S’s goals, 
aversions, and other cognitive stances, S will 
tend to act in appropriate ways.9
Note that the consequent in each embedded 
conditional involves a tendency to a certain 
manifestation. That’s because whether any 
such manifestation is forthcoming will de-
pend on whether any psychological or other 
obstacles are present. Note also the term 
“feel” in (2). By it, Alston does not mean a 
sensation or emotion. Rather, he means to 
“convey the idea that [the manifestation in 
question] possesses a kind of immediacy, that 
it is something one experiences rather than 
something that one thinks out, that it is a mat-
ter of being struck by (a sense of) how things 
are rather than deciding how things are.”10 
Others, he observes, call it “consciously 
[or occurrently] believing p.”11 Moreover, I 
cannot, just by an act of will, stop believing 
something I now believe, nor can I, just by an 
act of will, begin to believe something I do 
not now believe. Belief is not under our direct 
voluntary control. Finally, folk psychology 
is right: there really are beliefs. Of course, 
there is much to be said in favor of trading in 
belief for graded confidence or credence, as 
many Bayesians do. So it would be wise to 
put what I have to say in terms of both views. 
To do that, however, would complicate the 
discussion too much. Therefore, with apolo-
gies, I’ll stick with the folk psychological 
characterization of the relevant terrain.
 As for doubt, we must distinguish having 
doubts about whether p from being in doubt 
about whether p, and both of them from 
doubting that p. For one to have doubts about 
whether p—note the “s”—is for one to have 
what appear to one to be grounds to believe 
not-p and, as a result, for one to be at least 
somewhat inclined to disbelieve p. For one 
to be in doubt about whether p is for one 
neither to believe nor disbelieve p as a result 
of one’s grounds for p seeming to be roughly 
on a par with one’s grounds for not-p. One 
can have doubts without being in doubt, and 
one can be in doubt without having doubts. 
Having doubts and being in doubt are not to 
be identified with doubting that. If one doubts 
that something is so, one is at least strongly 
inclined to disbelieve it; having doubts and 
being in doubt lack that implication.
 These remarks must suffice to indicate 
how I will be thinking of belief and doubt. I 
should add, though, that while some things 
I have to say in what follows depend on my 
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characterizations of belief and doubt, others 
do not. Notably, the structure of faith on offer 
by the end of the essay, and the basic thrust 
of the rationale for it, might be wed to other 
characterizations of belief and doubt.
2. The Common View
 According to the Common View, faith that 
p requires belief that p, or it must be partially 
constituted by belief that p. I suspect that the 
Common View is mistaken. Before I explain 
why, it will prove useful to understand why 
belief that p is not sufficient for faith that p. 
There are at least two reasons, both of which 
shed light on what faith is.
 First, one can believe something and not 
be for its truth, but one cannot have faith that 
something is so and not be for its truth. Alston 
illustrates the point well: “[If someone] is said 
to have faith that democracy will eventually 
be established everywhere, that implies . . . 
that [she] looks on this prospect with favor.”12 
Robert Adams concurs: “To have faith is al-
ways to be for that in which one has faith. It 
is perfectly consistent to say you believe that 
Bill Clinton will win but you are still plan-
ning to vote for George Bush; but a genuine 
Bush supporter could hardly have faith that 
Clinton will win.”13 And Robert Audi too: 
“[I]f I do not have a favorable attitude toward 
something’s happening, I cannot have faith 
that it will.”14 This is why we do not have 
faith that terrorism will occur frequently in 
the twenty-first century, although we believe 
it will. To be for the truth of a proposition 
minimally requires considering its truth to be 
good or desirable, and we do not consider the 
truth of that proposition to be good or worthy 
of desire.15 (I’ll have more to say about the 
being-for-it requirement later.)
 Second, one can believe something even 
though one has no tendency at all to feel 
disappointment upon learning that it’s not 
so, but one cannot have faith that something 
is so without at least some tendency to feel 
disappointment upon learning that it’s not 
so. That’s because one can have faith that 
something is so only if one cares that it is so; 
and one can care that something is so only if 
one has some tendency to feel disappointment 
upon learning that it’s not so.
 One might object: you can care that p with-
out having any tendency to feel disappoint-
ment upon learning not-p. The farmer cares 
that the drought will continue, but she has no 
tendency to feel disappointment upon learn-
ing that it won’t. In reply, we must distinguish 
caring that from caring about. One can care 
about whether p even though one has no ten-
dency to feel disappointment upon learning 
it’s not so, since caring about is compatible 
with negative valence toward its truth. Car-
ing that p, however, requires positive valence 
toward its truth. So although the farmer cares 
about whether the drought will continue, she 
does not care that it will continue, given her 
negative valence toward its continuing. If you 
find this distinction specious, substitute “one 
can care-with-positive-valence that p only if 
one has some tendency to feel disappointment 
upon learning that it’s not so” for the premise, 
and adjust the argument here and elsewhere 
when relevant.16
 I conclude that belief is not sufficient for 
faith. One has faith that p only if one cares 
that p and one is for p’s truth, at least in the 
sense that one considers p’s truth to be good 
or desirable.
 Of course, even if belief that p is insuf-
ficient for faith that p, it might nevertheless 
be necessary. This is the Common View. Four 
considerations jointly tell against it.
 First, suppose we were talking about the 
sour economy and our retirement plans, and I 
said: “I am in doubt about whether I’ll recover 
my losses, but I still have faith that I will.” 
Or suppose I confided in you, my friend: “I 
don’t know what to believe, whether she’ll 
stay with me or not, but I have faith that she’ll 
stay.” Or imagine that I disclosed to you in a 
heart-to-heart exchange: “I can’t tell whether 
what I’ve got to go on favors the existence of 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
God, but I have faith that God exists nonethe-
less.” You wouldn’t be perplexed, bewildered, 
or suspicious at all about what I said; at least 
you need not be. What I said wasn’t weird, 
or infelicitous; there’s nothing here that cries 
out for explanation. That’s because, given 
the standard uses of “faith that” and “being 
in doubt about whether” in contemporary 
English, being in doubt about something need 
not be at odds with having faith that it is so. 
But in that case, our concept of propositional 
faith allows one to have faith that p without 
belief that p. For, unlike faith that p, belief 
that p is at odds with being in doubt about it, 
not least because if one is in doubt, one will 
lack tendencies that one has if one believes, 
for example, a tendency to assert p upon being 
asked whether p.17
 Second, one can have faith that p but lack 
a tendency to be surprised upon learning it’s 
not so; disappointment, yes, but not surprise. 
However, one cannot believe p while lacking 
a tendency to be surprised upon learning it’s 
not so. Thus, one can have faith that p without 
belief that p.
 Third, one can have faith that p even if one 
does not believe p but rather merely believes p 
is likely, or p is twice as likely as not, and so 
on. For example, Harvey might know that his 
colon cancer will get the best of him before 
the season’s end; nevertheless, he might yet 
have faith that he will face death with grace 
and courage even if he only believes that he 
will probably succeed. In this respect, faith 
is like propositional hope and propositional 
fear: it allows probabilistic beliefs to stand in 
for the cognitive stance it requires.
 A question naturally arises at this point: if 
faith that p does not require believing p, is it 
compatible with dis-believing p? I think not. 
For if you disbelieve p, you will have tenden-
cies to behavior, feeling, and so on that are 
at odds with faith that p. For example, if I 
disbelieve that my marriage will last, I’ll tend 
to say it won’t, when asked; I’ll tend to feel 
it to be the case that it won’t when I consider 
the matter; I’ll tend to use the proposition that 
it won’t as a premise in my practical reason-
ing; and I’ll tend to do things appropriate to 
its not lasting, for example, withdraw from 
intimacy, look for another place to live, and 
the like.
 The incongruity of faith and disbelief 
suggests that faith requires a more positive 
cognitive stance toward its object precisely 
because the dispositional profiles of negative 
stances like disbelief are incongruent with 
faith. This opens the door to stances distinct 
from belief to stand in for the positive cogni-
tive stance faith requires, provided that their 
dispositional profiles are congruent with faith. 
Are there any such stances?
 One might think so; after all, notice the 
plethora of folk psychological terms for 
positive cognitive stances: “acceptance,” 
“acknowledgment,” “affirmation,” “assent,” 
“assumption,” “belief,” “confidence,” “con-
viction,” “credence,” etc. Although it would 
be hasty to suppose that each term stands for 
a different stance, it would be equally hasty 
to suppose that every term stands for the same 
stance. Interestingly, many philosophers think 
some of them stand for different stances. For 
example, many think that belief differs from 
acceptance, although they disagree over the 
difference. This isn’t the place to enter that 
dispute. Instead, I’ll make my point on the 
assumption that there is a difference and that 
Alston’s account of it is near enough true to 
serve my purpose.18
 According to Alston, belief differs from 
acceptance in three ways. (i) Belief is a dis-
positional mental state while acceptance is a 
mental act. One finds oneself with a belief, 
whereas to accept p is “to adopt” or “take 
on” a positive attitude toward p. (ii) Belief is 
not under our direct voluntary control while 
acceptance is. (iii) The act of acceptance nor-
mally engenders a dispositional state much 
like belief, a state also labeled “acceptance,” 
unfortunately. This state differs from belief. 
Recall Alston’s partial dispositional profile 
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of belief, items (1)–(6) in section 1 above. 
Contrasting belief and the state of acceptance 
with reference to that list, he writes:
Belief will involve more confident, un-
hesitating manifestations of these sorts than 
acceptance will. But in the main, the story on 
these components—specifically (1), (3), (4), 
(5), and (6)—will be same for acceptance. (In 
(3), substitute “tend to accept” for “tend to 
believe”.) By far the largest difference is the 
absence of (2). The complex dispositional state 
engendered by accepting p will definitely not 
include a tendency to feel that p if the question 
of whether p arises.19
By way of illustration, Alston describes a 
field general who must dispose his forces for 
battle with information insufficient to believe 
any of several competing views about how he 
might best do so. What does he do? He adopts 
the view that seems most likely to succeed, 
takes a stand on its truth, and acts on that 
basis. In short, he accepts it, which engenders 
dispositions to appropriate troop dispersal, 
and the like.20 Alston describes his stance 
on libertarian freedom similarly. He doesn’t 
believe we have it; he takes objections much 
too seriously for that. Rather he adopts it, 
regards it as true, and draws inferences from 
it in his theoretical and practical reasoning.21
 So, according to Alston, the state of ac-
ceptance differs from belief in two ways: its 
manifestations will tend to be less confident 
and more hesitating than those of belief, and 
its dispositional profile lacks a tendency to 
feel that p if the question of whether p arises.
 Despite these differences, the profile of 
the state of acceptance is congruent with 
faith since, first of all, one instance of faith 
can be weaker than another because it is less 
confident and more hesitating—weak faith 
is faith nonetheless. Secondly, any concern 
due to the lack of a tendency to feel that p 
comes from the thought that faith requires a 
disposition to take a stand on the truth of its 
object, and only belief suffices for that. But 
one can be disposed to take a stand on the 
truth of a proposition in many ways, one of 
which is to have a tendency to assert it when 
asked whether it’s so. One need not have in 
addition a tendency to feel that it’s so. So, 
acceptance suffices for the positive cognitive 
stance faith requires.
 We have, then, a fourth reason to think that 
the Common View is mistaken: acceptance is 
not belief, and it can stand in for the positive 
cognitive stance faith requires.
3. Faith and Desire
 One can have faith that something is so only 
if one is for it, at least in the sense that one 
considers its truth to be good or desirable. 
The being-for-it requirement of faith requires 
more, however.
 For consider this: You have faith that p only 
if you consider p’s truth to be good or desir-
able, but you cannot do that unless you want 
it to be the case that p; so you have faith that 
p only if you want it to be the case that p. To 
be sure, you might have conflicting desires; 
indeed, you might only want it a little bit. 
Nevertheless, unless you want p to be the 
case, you cannot have faith that p.
 Many will deny the premise that you can-
not consider p’s truth to be good or desirable 
unless you want it to be the case that p. This 
is an ancient dispute, one that I will sidestep. 
For, even if you can consider p’s truth to be 
good or desirable without wanting it to be the 
case that p, three other considerations remain 
for thinking that faith that p requires at least 
something in the neighborhood of desire for 
the truth of p.
 First: one has faith that p only if one cares 
that p, but one cares that p only if one has 
some desire for p to be true. After all, if I 
have no desire that you finish your novel or 
that our friendship continue, I am indifferent 
to these things; I don’t care that they are so. 
Therefore, one has faith that p only if one has 
some desire for p to be true.
 We might resist. Imagine a meth addict who 
has no desire whatsoever to stop but who, 
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upon coming to recognize how much better 
his life might be if he were to stop, wants to 
want to stop. In that case, if he’s disposed to 
do something about changing his first-order 
desire and his behavior, say, by seeking 
therapy, then, even if he has so far failed, he 
is not indifferent to stopping; he cares at least 
somewhat that he stops.22
 Notice that the first- and second-order de-
sire cases share something in common: hav-
ing a desire in virtue of which one cares that p. 
Might one have a desire in virtue of which one 
cares that p without having a first- or higher-
order desire for p’s truth? Maybe. Imagine a 
young mother battling a recurrence of breast 
cancer; she has no first- or higher-order de-
sire to live due to the depression-inducing 
side-effects of the treatment. Nevertheless, 
she cares that she survives since she consid-
ers her survival desirable for the sake of her 
children, and she longs for them to flourish. 
She wants what her detestable life can bring, 
their flourishing; but she has no desire to live, 
first- or higher-order. If this is possible, one 
can have faith that something is so, while 
having no first- or higher-order desire for its 
truth. Nevertheless, one must have a desire in 
virtue of which one cares that it is so. This is 
what faith requires.
 Here’s a second argument. Like other 
complex propositional attitudes, for example, 
fear and hope, faith motivates behavior. In 
the case of fear, this is indicated by the fact 
that all you need to know to understand why 
the hiker is beating the grass as she walks 
through the meadow is that she fears that 
rattlesnakes lie nearby. In the case of hope, 
it’s indicated by the fact that all you need to 
know to understand why the climber is wav-
ing toward the sky is that he hopes that he’ll 
catch the eye of the search-and-rescue pilot. 
Fear and hope have built in to them what it 
takes to motivate behavior; that’s why they 
explain it. The same goes for faith. All you 
need to know to understand why Yehuda 
continues to study Torah despite his doubts 
is that he has faith that the basic Jewish story 
is true. All you need to know to understand 
why a couple seeks marital counseling is that 
they have faith that they can work things out. 
Like fear and hope, faith motivates behavior; 
that’s why it explains it. But cognition alone 
cannot motivate behavior; desire is required. 
Like propositional fear and hope, therefore, 
propositional faith has desire built into it.
 Third: One can have faith that something 
is so only if one has a tendency to feel disap-
pointment upon learning that it’s false. But 
if one has a tendency to feel disappointment 
upon learning that it’s false, then one cares 
that it’s so. However, if one cares that it’s so, 
one desires its truth, or at least has a desire 
in virtue of which one cares that it’s so. So 
one can have faith that something is so only 
if one has a desire in virtue of which one 
cares that it’s so.
 If any of these considerations are on target, 
then, even if one can have faith that p without 
desire for the truth of p, one cannot have faith 
that p without a desire in virtue of which one 
cares that p. As we’ve just seen, different sorts 
of desires might satisfy that description; so 
let’s gather them all under the rubric of a posi-
tive conative orientation and say that faith 
that p requires a positive conative orientation 
toward the truth of p.
4. Faith and Doubt
 Belief and acceptance are distinct; neverthe-
less, each can stand in for the positive cogni-
tive stance faith requires. However, each is at 
odds with being in doubt; if one believes or 
accepts something, one will have tendencies 
that one will lack if one is in doubt about it, 
for example, a tendency to assert it when asked 
whether it is so. Therefore, since faith need not 
be at odds with being in doubt, something else 
can stand in for the positive cognitive stance 
faith requires. What might it be?
 To begin to see one answer to our ques-
tion, consider the following three very short 
stories.
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Northbound
 It’s May 6, 2010. I’m at the southern ter-
minus of the Pacific Crest Trail, the Mexican 
border with California. After some good-
byes, I start to walk to Canada, 2,655 miles 
north. A lot can go wrong in 2,655 miles. 
Most nights, after two dozen up-and-down 
miles in the sun, I’m beat. Now, nearly 
four weeks and 500 miles later, I’m terribly 
homesick. Do I believe I won’t make it to 
Canada? Not at all. I feel stronger every day; 
trail camaraderie is pleasurable, as is meet-
ing demanding daily goals; and the beauty 
of the high desert in Spring is astounding. 
Moreover, my family is planning a rendez-
vous. Besides, what better way to express 
gratitude at midlife than a walk from Mexico 
to Canada? So then, do I believe I will make 
it? Not at all. A lot can go wrong in 2,155 
miles. Indeed, given what I’ve got to go on, 
I can’t even hazard a guess as to how likely 
it is that I will make it. Nevertheless, each 
morning I picture Monument 78 at the Cana-
dian border just north of Hart’s Pass with me 
standing next to it smiling, and I head north 
on the assumption that, come September, that 
picture will be reality.
Captain Morgan
 On the trail, there’s a saying about the 
relationship between a sleeping trailside 
rattlesnake and a group of hikers passing 
by: the first wakes it up, the second pisses 
it off, and the third gets bit. I was the third. 
Fortunately for me, this unseen rattler, coiled 
deep in the sand under some scrub, did not 
bite me. Captain Morgan was not so fortu-
nate. It’s dusk and, four paces behind me, 
he speaks of his new right hip and shoulder, 
replacements for the ones he lost to a roadside 
bomb in Iraq nine months earlier. He tells me 
how he aims to continue his recovery on his 
walk to Canada, when—all of a sudden—he 
stops and says matter-of-factly, “It bit me. 
It didn’t even rattle,” pointing to a 40-inch 
Mojave Green, silent and still. We inspect 
his wound. I dial 911; no reception. Twenty 
minutes later, at Tyler Horse Creek, he’s 
calm with no symptoms. Rattlesnakes control 
envenomation, sometimes delivering “dry 
bites” to animals too large to eat; moreover, 
a snake’s timing can be off so that it releases 
its venom before sinking its fangs. Maybe 
Captain got lucky. The next morning he says 
he feels fine, so the other hikers congregated 
at the creek move on. I stay. Thirty minutes 
later, he heaves up his breakfast and continues 
to wretch every two minutes or so; he quickly 
becomes weak and feverish, breathing with 
difficulty; signs of delirium appear.23 He 
needs help . . . fast. But which way should he 
go? Should he backtrack 24 miles to Highway 
138, or forge ahead 24 miles to Highway 58? 
Our maps give us no reason to prefer either 
route. Three miles ahead, there’s a two-mile 
side-trail to a trailhead; might we find a ve-
hicle to hotwire at midweek? Five miles back 
there’s a dirt road into the hills; might it lead 
to a home? Maybe he should stay put at the 
creek, the only sure source of water in this 
48-mile stretch; perhaps a hiker with a work-
ing phone will arrive and we can call in an 
airlift. Time is short; he needs to decide. He 
rules out staying put and decides that moving 
ahead is slightly better than going back. So 
he stumbles forward on the assumption that 
help lies ahead.
Eliotwright
 In an insightful autobiographical essay, 
William Wainwright characterizes his stance 
toward God as one filtered through a “congen-
ital skepticism” that renders it difficult for him 
“to embrace any controversial [proposition] 
without some hesitation.”24 Nevertheless, he 
writes, “classical theistic metaphysics” has 
come to seem “more reasonable to me, on the 
whole, than its alternatives” and it “survives 
criticism at least as well as, and probably 
better than, its competitors.”25 Moreover, 
sensitive to what he describes as the frailty 
of “human effort, thought, and ideals when 
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confronted by what [Paul] Tillich called the 
threat of death, meaninglessness, and sin,” he 
has long been attracted to what the Christian 
story has to say about these matters. In light 
of these and other considerations, he says that 
“even if Christian theism isn’t more probable 
than not, it is still reasonable to embrace it” 
since, by his lights, it best addresses the whole 
of human experience and the evidence favors 
it over its competitors.26 He concludes the 
essay with this paragraph:
My attitude is in many ways similar to T. S. 
Eliot’s. Eliot appears to have combined a deeply 
serious faith with both irony and skepticism. 
(When asked why he accepted Christianity, he 
said he did so because it was the least false of 
the options open to him.) . . . I do not regard 
my stance as exemplary. If Christianity (or 
indeed any form of traditional theism) is true, a 
faith free from doubt is surely better. I suspect, 
however, that my religious life may be fairly 
representative of the lives of many intelligent, 
educated, and sincere Christians in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.27
In personal correspondence, Wainwright 
indicates that he himself thinks Christianity 
is more likely than not. Eliot, however, is a 
different story. He thinks Christianity is “the 
least false” of the credible options, which 
suggests that by his lights, it is more likely 
than each of the options but less likely than 
their disjunction. Imagine, then, someone 
with Wainwright’s evaluative, conative, and 
behavioral orientation to Christianity but with 
Eliot’s cognitive stance. Call him Eliotwright.
 Five observations about our protagonists 
are relevant to our concerns.
 First, it seems apt to say that each of them 
has faith. I have faith that I will make it to 
Canada; Captain Morgan has faith that help 
lies ahead; Eliotwright has faith that the basic 
Christian story is true.
 Second, we neither believe nor accept these 
things. I have no tendency to feel it to be 
the case that I’ll make it to Canada. Captain 
Morgan not only lacks that tendency, he lacks 
any tendency to assert that help lies ahead, 
and he lacks any tendency to be surprised 
upon learning that it doesn’t. We can easily 
imagine that the same goes for Eliotwright.
 Third, each of us is in doubt about the ob-
ject of his faith. I think that what I’ve got to go 
on puts me in no position to say whether I’ll 
make it to Canada, not even very roughly how 
likely it is. Captain Morgan thinks staying 
put has the least going for it, and that moving 
forward is slightly better than backtracking. 
Eliotwright thinks Christianity is the least 
false of the credible options, which suggests 
that he deems his evidence for Christianity to 
be no better than the evidence for the disjunc-
tion of the options.
 Fourth, despite our lack of belief and accep-
tance and despite our doubt, each of us acts on 
a certain assumption. I act on the assumption 
that I will make it to Canada. Captain Morgan 
acts on the assumption that help lies ahead. 
Eliotwright acts on the assumption that the 
basic Christian story is true. Take note: there 
really is something that each of us acts on; 
it’s called an assumption.
 Fifth, in virtue of our assumptions, each of 
us tends to behave in expectable ways. I as-
sume I will make it to Canada, and so I pick 
up camp each morning and head north, whit-
tling away at the six million steps between 
borders, scheduling re-supplies, dreaming 
of family rendezvous along the way, and so 
on. Captain Morgan assumes help lies ahead, 
and so he rises from his knees, slings his 
pack onto his back, and staggers forward. 
Eliotwright assumes the basic Christian story 
is true, and so he makes confession, gives 
thanks, kneels to receive the Body of Christ, 
and so on.
 It seems, therefore, that we have found 
something distinct from belief and accep-
tance—something that is at home with being 
in doubt, something that can stand in for 
the positive cognitive stance faith requires: 
assuming.
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5. Faith and Assuming
 What, exactly, is assuming? This is a very 
difficult question. Unlike belief and accep-
tance, assuming has received little attention. 
Still, perhaps half a dozen observations might 
not fall too far from the truth.
 First, we use “assume” in different ways. 
We sometimes use it with reference to things 
we believe or accept; and we sometimes use 
it with reference to things we disbelieve and 
reject. But, as with our protagonists, we 
sometimes use it with reference to things 
we neither believe nor accept, and things we 
neither disbelieve nor reject: things we are 
in doubt about. I mean to employ that use of 
the word.
 Second observation: We must not identify 
assuming with acting as if. One can act as 
if p while disbelieving p, but one cannot as-
sume p while disbelieving p. For when one 
assumes p, one has not settled on not-p; but 
when one disbelieves p, one has settled on 
not-p, even though one might dissemble and 
act as if p.
 Third, perhaps the relation between acting 
as if and assuming—or, more accurately, 
perhaps the relation between a disposition 
to act as if and assuming—is that of genus 
to species. If it is, then acting as if need not 
involve pretense. For although some species 
of acting as if might require pretense, for ex-
ample, acting as if you’re a frog while playing 
charades, the assumings of our protagonists 
involve no pretense at all. I am not pretending 
I will make it to Canada; Captain Morgan is 
not pretending that help lies ahead; and El-
iotwright is not pretending that Christianity 
is true.
 Fourth observation: Since assuming of the 
sort at issue is at home with being in doubt, 
its dispositional profile will differ from those 
of belief and acceptance. In particular, if S 
assumes p, she will lack a tendency to feel it 
to be the case that p upon considering wheth-
er p; she will lack a tendency to assert that 
p when asked whether p, unless it is clear to 
her that she will not be misunderstood for 
expressing a more positive cognitive stance; 
and she will lack a tendency to be surprised 
upon learning not-p.
 Fifth, despite these differences, assuming 
functions similarly to belief and acceptance in 
reasoning and other behavior. Specifically, if 
one assumes p, then, if one takes q to follow 
from p, one will tend to assume q. And if one 
assumes p, then, if one engages in practical 
or theoretical reasoning, one will tend to use 
p as a premise when appropriate. And, in 
general, if one assumes p, then, given one’s 
goals, aversions, and other cognitive stances, 
one will tend to act in appropriate ways.
 Finally, although the dispositional profile 
of assuming differs from that of acceptance, 
it is nonetheless congruent with proposi-
tional faith. Three considerations jointly 
suggest this.
 (i) Like the profiles of believing p and ac-
cepting p but unlike the profile of disbelieving 
p, the profile of assuming p lacks the tenden-
cies to feel not-p is the case upon consider-
ing p, to affirm or assert not-p when asked 
whether p, and to be surprised upon learning 
p. In these respects, the profile of assuming 
p is congruent with faith that p.
 (ii) One can be in doubt about something 
and still have faith that it’s so. But one can be 
in doubt about something only if one lacks a 
tendency to be surprised upon learning it’s 
not so and one lacks a tendency to assert it 
(absent some special motive to assert it, for 
example, to deceive someone). Thus, one 
can have faith while lacking both of these 
tendencies, in which case the difference 
between the profiles of acceptance and as-
suming do not render assuming incongruent 
with faith.
 (iii) Although the profile of assuming lacks 
these two tendencies, it includes other ten-
dencies that constitute a disposition to take 
a stand on the truth of what is assumed. For 
just as when one accepts p, when one as-
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sumes p, one will tend to use p as a premise 
in practical and theoretical reasoning when 
appropriate, and one will, more generally, 
tend to act in ways befitting one’s goals, 
aversions, and other mental states. This is 
why we expect that, when Eliotwright as-
sumes the basic Christian story, he will have 
a tendency to infer that, in the end, all will be 
well, that he should confess his sins, and so 
on; this is why we expect that, when Captain 
Morgan assumes that help lies ahead and he 
wants to get help, he will walk forward. By 
performing these actions rather than others, 
they manifest their disposition to take a stand 
on the truth of their assumptions, albeit a 
weaker stand than that of acceptance (or 
belief).
6. Propositional Faith: What It Is
 An account of propositional faith emerges 
from the foregoing reflections. Faith that p 
is a complex propositional attitude consist-
ing of (i) a positive evaluation of p, that is, 
considering p to be good or worthy of desire; 
(ii) a positive conative orientation toward p; 
and (iii) a positive cognitive stance toward 
p. Although nothing can be faith without 
these constituents, different items can stand 
in for each. To clarify the proposal, consider 
Diagram 1:
 Belief that p can stand in for the positive 
cognitive stance, and desire for p’s truth can 
stand in for the positive conative orientation. 
Hence Diagram 2:
Each box to the left is filled to convey the 
idea that nothing is propositional faith unless 
it answers to those descriptions. Each box 
to the right is empty to convey the idea that 
different things can answer to those descrip-
tions. Nothing that fills in an empty box is a 
necessary constituent of faith; rather, some 
filling in or other that answers the description 
to its left is required.
Acceptance and a second-order desire can 
stand in as well. Hence Diagram 3:
I have argued that assuming can stand in too, 
which is displayed in Diagram 4:
Although it has gone unmentioned, a variety 
of positive cognitive stances can stand in for 
“considering” p to be good or desirable, the 
positive evaluation of p. And there may be 
other items that can stand in for the required 
constituents of faith.
7. The Obama Objection
 Suppose you believe that Barack Obama will 
win the election; moreover, you think that his 
winning would be a good thing, and you want 
him to win. If the account of propositional 
faith on offer is complete, then you have faith 
that Obama will win. The problem is that you 
don’t. The account, therefore, is incomplete.
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 What’s missing is resilience in the face of 
new contrary evidence. What if unemploy-
ment increased? What if it came out that 
Obama “pulled a Lewinsky”? What if his 
popularity ratings took a dive? Let your 
imagination rip! In the face of increasing 
counter-evidence, would you still think it a 
good thing that he won? “Of course,” you say. 
Would you still want him to? “Absolutely,” 
you reply. “After all, the economy is Bush’s 
fault, and adultery isn’t relevant to presiden-
tial leadership; moreover, consider the alter-
native.” The crucial question, though, is this: 
Would you still believe that he’ll win? “Yes!” 
you say. Then you have faith that he will. 
Nothing counts as faith unless one’s cognitive 
stance—in this case, your belief—is resistant 
to what one regards as contrary evidence.
 This line of thought is mistaken. For 
although I agree that what’s missing is re-
silience in the face of what one regards as 
new contrary evidence, it is a mistake to 
understand that resilience solely in terms of 
the resistance of one’s cognitive stance to 
what one regards as new counter-evidence. 
That’s one way the resilience faith requires 
can be instantiated, but it is not the only way; 
nor is it necessary. For the resilience of one’s 
faith can be manifested instead by one’s be-
ing disposed to behave in certain ways upon 
discovering new counter-evidence.
 To illustrate the point, consider a variation 
on the Obama story. As before, you believe 
he’ll win the election, you think his winning 
is a good thing, and you want him to win. 
And, as before, if you were to discover new 
counter-evidence to his winning, you would 
still think his winning is a good thing and still 
want him to win. Unlike before, however, 
suppose that your cognitive stance, your 
belief that he’ll win, is not resistant to new 
counter-evidence. If you were to recognize 
new evidence that led you to think that the 
election was going to be close, you would 
not dig in your cognitive heels and believe all 
the same; rather, you would properly adjust, 
perhaps going from belief to weak belief, or 
belief to belief that it’s only slightly more 
likely than not, or belief to mere assuming, or 
what have you. Even so, you might yet have 
faith that he’ll win. For it might be that, in 
relevant counterfactual situations like the one 
we are imagining, despite properly adjusting 
your positive cognitive stance, you would 
remain resolved—as you presently are, let’s 
suppose—to spend an evening each week 
talking with undecided voters, to tithe your 
earnings to his campaign, and so on. Alter-
natively, it might be that you would resolve 
to make investments and plans that would 
most likely pay off only if Obama won, and 
the like. And there are plenty of other options 
as well. The point is that if you have faith 
that he’ll win, new counter-evidence would 
not take the wind out of your sails; it would 
not deter you; it would not discourage you 
into inaction; it would not dishearten you. If 
something like that constitutes your present 
dispositional profile, then you have faith that 
Obama will win. You satisfy faith’s demand 
for some measure of resilience and tenacity 
in the face of counter-evidence even though 
your cognitive stance is properly responsive 
to new counter-evidence.28
8. “By definition, faith is belief  
in the absence of evidence”
 En route to pooh-poohing faith in The Har-
vard Crimson, linguist Steven Pinker writes 
that faith is “believing something without 
good reasons to do so.”29 Similarly, philoso-
pher Alex Rosenberg began a recent debate 
ostensibly on the question of whether faith in 
God is reasonable by declaring that reason-
able faith in God wasn’t even possible since 
“by definition, faith is belief in the absence of 
evidence.”30 Not to be outdone by his fellow 
brights, biologist-rock-star Richard Dawkins 
goes one step further: “Faith is belief in spite 
of, even perhaps because of, the lack of 
evidence.”31 But no one goes as far as Mark 
Twain: faith is “believing what you know 
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ain’t so”!32 Let’s set aside the excesses of 
Dawkins and Twain and focus on Pinker and 
Rosenberg, according to whom one can have 
faith that something is so only if one has no 
good reason to believe it, no evidence at all. 
(I don’t mean to suggest that only secularists 
take this line. They’re just the shrillest.)
 Of course, if the Pinker-Rosenberg line is 
right, then it is absolutely impossible for one 
to have faith that something is so while one 
has some good reason for believing it, some 
evidence for it. But surely one can. Maria can 
have faith that her new venture, Prairie Road 
Farm, will succeed even though she has some 
good reason for believing it, for example, an 
accurate estimation of her resolve and her 
partner’s support in the endeavor.33 Christian 
can have faith that he will find another with 
whom he can be close despite the fact that 
he has some evidence in the form of couples 
not so different from himself who are close 
to each other.
 The Pinker-Rosenberg account can be mod-
erated into something more plausible: one can 
have faith that something is so only if one 
has insufficient reason for believing it, insuf-
ficient evidence. This moderate line is more 
plausible; nevertheless, it is implausible. For 
if it is correct, then it is absolutely impossible 
for one to have faith that something is so 
while one has sufficient reason or evidence 
to believe it. But surely one can. Suppose I 
care that your marriage flourishes, but you 
confide that certain difficulties persist; I natu-
rally express concern. You may well assure 
me that things are not so far gone that either 
you or your partner intend to split up but 
rather that you both anticipate happy results 
from the therapy you’ve begun. Your word 
is sufficient evidence for my faith that your 
marriage will survive despite the fact that it 
might also be sufficient evidence for me to 
believe the same. A child worried sick about 
her father’s prostate cancer asks his oncolo-
gist whether he will live. He tells her that her 
father’s prognosis is very favorable, so favor-
able that she should plan for him to walk her 
down the aisle some day if she wishes. Thus 
assured, she may well have faith that there 
will be such a day despite the fact that she 
has evidence sufficient for belief. Faith does 
not require insufficient evidence for belief.
 I have deeper misgivings. First, Pinker 
and Rosenberg identify faith with believing 
something on insufficient reason or evidence; 
if they’re right, one can have faith that p 
without either considering p’s truth to be 
good or desirable or caring that p—but one 
cannot. Second, if they’re right, faith requires 
belief—but it does not. For although one can 
have faith that p when one is in doubt about 
whether p, one cannot believe p in that case; 
moreover, although one can have faith that 
p when one lacks a tendency to be surprised 
upon learning not-p, one cannot believe p in 
that condition; furthermore, although one can 
have faith that p when one merely believes p 
is likely, or p is twice as likely as not, or p is 
much more likely than its credible contrar-
ies, one cannot believe that p while that is 
the case; finally, although one can have faith 
that p when one merely accepts p, or merely 
assents to p, or (belief-less-ly) assumes p, one 
cannot believe p in that condition.
 Third, Pinker, Rosenberg, and company 
imply that faith is necessarily evidentially 
subpar. Every other complex propositional 
attitude can fit one’s total evidence, for ex-
ample, Dennis’s hope that, while lost in the 
wilderness southeast of Lake Ann near Mt. 
Shuksan, Whatcom County Search and Res-
cue will find him, and his fear that they won’t. 
So why do they single out faith as necessarily 
evidentially subpar, as requiring insufficient 
reasons and evidence?
 Four reasons, I conjecture, but one of them 
isn’t very nice to say, and so I will mention 
only three. First, Pinker, Rosenberg, et al. 
think of faith only with religious content, 
and every instance of it is evidentially sub-
par, by their lights. Second, they mistake the 
false “nothing is faith unless it is evidentially 
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sub-par” for the true “nothing is faith unless 
it is evidentially sub-optimal,” a natural er-
ror. Third, they rightly discern that nothing 
counts as faith unless it is resilient to new 
counter-evidence, but they take a narrow 
view of the ways in which such resilience 
can be realized. If my conjecture is correct, 
Pinker, Rosenberg, and company would do 
well to reflect on instances of secular faith, 
recognize the import of the subpar-subop-
timal distinction, and expand their view of 
the ways in which the resilience required by 
faith can be realized.
9. Conclusion
 According to the account on offer here, 
faith that p is a complex propositional attitude 
consisting of (i) a positive evaluation of p, 
(ii) a positive conative orientation toward p, 
(iii) a positive cognitive stance toward p, and 
(iv) resilience to new counter-evidence to p. 
Importantly, assuming—assuming of the sort 
displayed above—can stand in for the positive 
cognitive stance faith requires. Since assum-
ing is at home with being in doubt, being in 
doubt is no impediment to faith. Doubt is not 
faith’s enemy; rather, the enemies of faith are 
misevaluation, indifference or hostility, and 
faintheartedness.
 Naturally, many questions remain about the 
account on offer. For example, I characterized 
belief and acceptance in a particular way, the 
way in which Alston did. What might faith 
look like given different characterizations, or 
given their elimination altogether in exchange 
for graded confidence? In addition, there are 
more objections to consider. For example, 
haven’t I simply confused faith and hope? 
Or, having packed so much into faith that, 
is there any room for faith in? Furthermore, 
alternative accounts of faith similarly at 
odds with the Common View have begun to 
sprout up. Why prefer the one on offer here? 
Finally, implications of theoretical and prac-
tical significance have gone unmentioned. 
For example, what does the account on offer 
imply for how we should go about evaluating 
the overall rationality or propriety of faith? 
What does it imply for our understanding of 
the virtue of faith? What does it imply for 
the age-old “problem of faith and reason” in 
the philosophy of religion? I aim to address 
these questions, objections, alternatives, and 
implications elsewhere.34 Here, however, I 
must rest content with a first pass at saying 
what propositional faith is and what it is not.
Western Washington University
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